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SUMMARY 
The Protection of Land Rights in Ethiopia 
Protection of land rights takes place within a complex 
interconnected environment of constantly changing domestic 
institutions and organizations at the federal, state and local levels of 
society. Usually these institutions and organizations function 
imperfectly, are the subject of a variety of ongoing reforms, and are 
poorly understood by those who seek to change them. These 
statements are as true of rich countries as of poor, but poverty does 
matter. This paper frames the Ethiopian environment within an 
Ecology of Land Rights Protection, presents examples of the current 
mixture of outcomes, and concludes with observations about the 
work of the Mekelle University Law Faculty in improving human 
rights protection. 
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153 I. LAND RIGHTS: DELINEATION 
For many people, land rights and their protection are central to life. 
But what are 'land rights'? More particularly, in the setting of this 
seminar, what human rights are recognized to land, or related to 
land? 
The international farmers movement La Via Campesina
1 has often 
articulated the need for a human right to land, particularly for 
subsistence farmers. Just as clearly they have demonstrated that 
there is none recognized internationally. 
Instead, what we find are a variety of general and specific (e.g., for 
women
2) human rights related to land (or the more ambiguous 
'home' or 'property'
3 which may or may not include land). These 
international rights related to land are all in the nature of more 
general human rights to due process of law
4, equal protection of 
law
5, and non-discrimination.
6 That is, if a person has land or if 
some right to land is recognized (as when a government-sponsored 
land redistribution occurs), then the right to land should not be 
taken, lost or denied without due process and equal protection of 
law, and no other recognized rights should be dependent on whether 
the person has land or not. 
However, domestic land rights are rarely affected by international 
instruments. We must look to domestic systems. In Ethiopia, both 
by incorporation of international agreements (Article 9.4) and 
inclusion of specific provisions (often identical in language to the 
international instruments), the current Constitution
7 includes both 
See, www.viacampesina.org 
2 Convention on Elimination of All Forms Of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) Article 14.2(g). 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 12 and 17, respectively 
4 UDHR Art. 8, 17; International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Art. 17, 26. 
5 UDHR Art. 7, 17; ICCPR Art. 17,26. 
5 UDHR Articles 2, 7, 17; ICCPR Art. 17,26. 
7 Proclamation No. 1/1995. It should be remembered that the Amharic 
version is the official version (Article 106). 
154 general human rights related to land, i.e., to due process, equal 
protection and nondiscrimination (Article 25), and specific rights for 
women (Article 35.5) and other groups (Article 40). 
But, quite unusually among the nations of the world, Ethiopia's 
Constitution also grants actual rights to rural
8 land (Article 40). 
Of course, as soon as that is said, it is necessary to ask what such a 
right entails. And, more generally, in order to provide the most 
elementary basis for this paper, we must distinguish between 
different 'rights' in land. For the bizarre and diverse nature of land 
rights, and the ability to fragment them in novel ways, appears to be 
limited only by failure of human imagination. In addition, each of 
these rights may be held by one or more different parties. For 
example, the right to use the surface
9 may be owned by one party, 
granted conditionally to another, leased on to several others, future 
interests assigned to yet others, and taken at any time in whole or 
part by the State. Thus, what is sometimes called the 'bundle' of land 
rights is, in almost all cases, fragmented and distributed over many 
holders so that an individual's rights in a particular parcel of land are 
actually quite restricted and limited by the rights of the State and 
other parties. Conflicts between all those holders of rights are, of 
course, common. 
Similarly, the current laws establishing and allocating land rights in 
Ethiopia distribute those rights among various holders. Most 
fundamentally, the Ethiopian Constitution places certain rights in 
the hands of the State: 
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all 
natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the 
peoples of Ethiopia. 
This paper focuses on rural and peri-urban land because urban land is under a 
different administrative system and almost all land in Ethiopia falls outside the 
urban category. 
9 Never mind rights to use the air above and subsurface, or the right to decide what 
use may be made of any of these - likely to be held by a local government. 
155 But then reserves to three classes of people specific rights to land: 
40.4. Ethiopian peasants have the right to obtain land without 
payment and the protection against eviction from their possession. 
The implementation of this provision shall be specified by law; 
40.5. Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing 
and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their 
own lands. The implementation shall be specified by law; 
40.6. Without prejudice to the right of Ethiopian Nations, Nationa-
lities, and Peoples to the ownership of land, government shall ensure 
the right of private investors to the use of land on the basis of 
payment arrangements established by law. Particulars shall be 
determined by law. 
It is important to note that each of these rights is hedged by the last 
provision in each paragraph, that the particulars of each right are to 
be determined by law. To date, these Constitutional provisions have 
been further delineated by two Federal laws
1
0 and the different laws 
and regulations of each of the Federal States (see below). 
By the Federal land laws, the Federal government's Constitutional 
authority to proclaim laws related to land (Article 51.5) has been 
partially delegated, within specific though broad guidelines, to the 
States.
1
1 This has allowed significant differences in State laws. The 
Constitution also allocates the authority to administer land and other 
natural resources in accordance with Federal laws directly to the 
States (Article 52.6). 
But, so far, how much the basic Constitutional rights may legally be 
modified by such laws is quite untested in the courts. For example, 
the right of children to inherit rural land has been both specifically 
Proclamation No. 89/1997, Rural Land Administration Proclamation Of The 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE); and Proclamation No. 456/2005, 
FDRE Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation. 
1
1 As can be seen by the fact that three States, Amhara, Oromia and Tigray, passed 
laws before authorized, the first Federal law was clearly an effort to catch up with 
State initiatives. 
156 acknowledged in the successive Federal land laws
1
2 and subject to 
limitations in State laws.
1
3 As a specific example, the laws of Tigray 
State both assure and limit inheritance of land. The State's goal is 
clearly to balance increased certainty of an adequate payback period 
and, thus, the holder's investment in land (Gebremehdin, B., 2003; 
Atwood, D., 1990; Barrows, R. and Roth, M., 1990), with the social 
welfare principle that the most needy descendants obtain the parents' 
very hmited land. The need to balance such competing policy prin-
ciples is prevalent in land rights legislation, but when eventually 
challenged the basic right may be determined by the courts to limit 
policy choices. 
II. PROTECTION OF LAND RIGHTS: 
A SCHEMATIC INTRODUCTION 
From the Land In Africa Conference (Quan, J., Tan, S., et al, 2005), 
we may take some lessons: economy, history, perspective, align-
ment of interests, and structural details all matter in the protection of 
land rights. In Tigray State, northern Ethiopia, where the detailed 
research on which this paper is based has been centered, and in the 
literature concerning land rights and our less in-depth research in 
other parts of Ethiopia, we have found the same to be true. 
A) Despite relatively rapid economic growth since 1991, Ethiopia 
remains one of the very poorest nations on earth and, within 
Ethiopia, Tigray State is the poorest area of the settled rural popu-
lation. Ethiopia has 70 million people and a Human Development 
Index placing it 170th out of 177 nations (UNDP 2005). Tigray has 
1
2 Proclamation No. 89/1997, Rural Land Administration Proclamation Of The 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Article 2.3; and Proclamation 
No. 456/2005, FDRE Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation, 
Article 8.5. 
1
3 State laws and regulations vary greatly. Tigray State adopted Proclamation No. 
23/1997, Rural Land Utilization Proclamation of The Tigray National Regional 
State, replaced in 2004, and Rural Land Utilization, investment, Agricultural and 
Natural Resources Development Regulation, Proclamation No. 15/2001/02, also 
with amendments. State proclamations issued before Federal devolution were 
legitimized by the Federal land laws inclusion of "savings clauses" that recognize 
earlier State laws that conform to specific guidelines. 
157 4 million people, of whom 85% are smallholder subsistence farmers; 
of these 75%, the largest proportion in any settled fanning area in 
Ethiopia, do not have enough land to produce a living (EEPRI 
2001). 
Smallholders working their land in Geba valley, Tigray (photo by J. Nyssen) 
B) Focusing on land rights, one of the striking differences between 
Ethiopia and other nations is its recent history. The current forms of 
land rights, and the systems for protecting them, exist today as the 
most recent iteration of a sequence of radical changes. Ancient 
customary laws were amended by, inter alia, Emperor Haile 
Selassie's mid-twentieth century efforts at modernization through 
introduction of a Constitution and a new Civil Code, and then again 
by the Derg (the Soviet Union-backed military dictatorship from 
1974 to 1991) Constitution and proclamations. The latter nationa-
lized all land, redistributed the majority of rural land, and, in the 
process, created new forms of land rights and, quite probably, 
extinguished almost all former land rights.
1
4 If we were to consider 
The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia (1975), Proclamation No.31 of 
1975, A Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands, Addis 
Ababa. Whether the "extinguished" rights to interests in land might be revived, 
158 the protection of land rights during that transformation period, we 
would find, particularly from the perspective of the establishment, 
many people's land rights badly abused.
1
5 But today - thirty years 
after the Derg transformation - the problems entailed by over-
lapping historical and regional land tenure systems in other nations
1
6 
are relatively mild in Ethiopia. 
C) There are many perspectives from which the success of a land 
rights protection system may be judged quite differently, e.g., those 
of the poor, rich, rural or urban citizens, as well as the admi-
nistrators', politicians and 'disinterested' observers. But the pers-
pective of the economic historian Douglass North (North, D., 1990), 
in terms of institutions, both formal and informal, provides 
particularly penetrating insights to the protection of land rights. 
Simply put, North uses the word 'institutions' to mean 'the rules of 
the game', rather than organizations, with formal rules including 
constitution, laws and regulations and informal rules including a 
variety of other rule-like constraints on behavior, such as customs, 
traditions and even habits. Of particular importance is the finding 
that formal rules are relatively easy to change while informal rules 
are much harder. Using these concepts, 'administrative discretion' 
may be understood as one important place where formal and infor-
mal rules meet, sometimes producing innovative solutions to unfore-
seen problems, as intended, but also providing fertile grounds for 
various forms of abuse of power. 
either politically or through judicial action, is unknown. Efforts in other countries, 
from Kenya to the USA, have had very mixed results. In addition, for example, 
some villages in Tigray have reallocated land to the church (e.g., in Felig Daro 
tabia, Tigray State, a plot of traditionally irrigated land that is leased to a local 
farmer each year by auction), perhaps reducing pressure to reinstating prior rights. 
1
5 In addition, the Derg prohibited the renting out of land, and other transactions 
(sales, mortgages, sharecropping and hiring in labor) were severely restricted. The 
current FDRE Constitution reinstates some (renting land in and out, sharecropping, 
and hiring in labor) but not all (sales and mortgages are still prohibited) of these 
rights. There has been some debate about how extensive the changes really were 
(Marcus, H. 1994). 
1
6 E.g., Cousins, B. and Claassens, A., 2006, document the complicated and 
contentious results in South Africa. 
159 D) Alignment of interests is not always possible. To demonstrate 
this, let us consider rural Tigray
17, where demand far outstrips 
available land. Past land redistributions - in some villages in Tigray 
as many as a dozen times between 1974 and 1989, 'trying to get it 
right' - created uncertainly, undercut investment in land, and created 
hard feelings. The land registration and certification undertaken in 
the mid-90s were desired by farmers to clearly mark the official end 
of redistributions. 
But, when massive land redistributions were stopped, access to land 
suddenly changed from primarily
1
8 village allocation to mostly 
family allocation. And, because family land holdings were already 
too small, many young people reaching the age when they should 
receive access to rural land found none available either from their 
family or the village. They saw registration and certification as the 
end of any possibility of obtaining land, and made their disquiet 
known. 
Their demand for land, together with improved malaria control, 
eventually formed the primary motive force behind the government's 
recent opening of unsettled land along Ethiopia's western border to 
new voluntary settlements. In this way, over time, the alignment of 
interests has evolved and, by some measures, improved, but not 
without large social changes and costs. 
E) Comparison of the Tigray land rights protection efforts with the 
subsequent efforts of the Amhara State to implement a similar 
program illuminates how systemic differences arise. As is more 
fully described below, the 'Tigray Model' of land rights preservation 
is embedded in the village local government. When Amhara State 
subsequently began a similar system, fresh in the minds of the citi-
zens were the more recent (1996/1997, compared to 1989 in Tigray) 
1
7 There is evidence from family land holding size that the conditions in other areas 
of Ethiopia are not as pressured (EEA/EEPRI, 2002; Mersha, G. and wa Githinji, 
M., 2005). 
1
8 As discussed below, some land also still returns to the village local government 
and is available for distribution to adults retarning to the village and youths coming 
of age. 
160 and probably punitive (Hoben, A., 2001; Adal, Y., 1997; Debele, B., 
1997; Ege, S., 1997) land redistributions that had left many people 
afraid of the local governments that had administered them. There-
fore
19, the administrative portion of the Amhara State land rights 
protection system was set up as an independent line organization, 
intentionally removing land issues from the grasp of local govern-
ment. Whether this change in the 'Tigray Model' will be followed in 
Tigray is not clear. Some of the new parallel structure has recently 
been put in place in Tigray, but the benefits of the system operating 
through the local government, described below, are also well 
appreciated. 
Traditional agroforestry trees bordering farm plots in Tigray (photo by J. Nyssen) 
More generally, this is but one structural difference among a very 
large possible number.
2
0 Still, though land rights are handled in very 
different ways in different nations
21, all land rights protection 
Personal communication, Legal Advisor to the President of Amhara State, 
February 2005. 
2
0 The definition of 'rural land administration' in the current Federal land law 
recognizes this: "...means a process whereby rural land holding security is 
provided, land use planning is implemented, disputes between rural land holders are 
resolved and the rights and obligations of any rural land holder are enforced, and 
information on farm plots and grazing land holders are gathered, analyzed and 
supplied to users." Proclamation 456/2005, Section 2.2. 
2
1 The current efforts just within the European Union to reduce institutional barriers 
to land transactions has also found this. Personal interview with UK member of the 
161 systems seem to entail a combination of institutions and 
organizations in the following functionally defined niches. We call 
this an Ecology of Land Rights Protection
22: 
• Identification of a piece of land: This may be done with simple 
(and often cheap) or sophisticated (and usually more expensive) 
technologies. For example, a piece of land within a small 
community may be defined simply by the name of the holder or 
the names of the neighbors; it may be marked on the ground 
(e.g., with natural landmarks, stone walls, steal pins, or fabri-
cated monuments); or it may be described with various types of 
more or less accurate measurements so that the land can be 
located on the ground when there is a dispute. 
• Creation of rights: Over time, various rights in the piece of land 
are created and allocated to individuals, groups, the State, and 
other levels of government. Various social institutions and 
organizations create the initial rights, and the many limitations on 
them (e.g., royal or State grants, Federal and State laws, local 
land-use plans, commuirity bylaws or even customs), and their 
allocation. Cognizance of all sources of rights is important if 
their interaction is to be predictable. 
• Transformation of rights: Changes in the initial rights, and the 
person or persons or organizations holding them, occur through 
private intentional transactions (e.g., sales or leases) but also 
through more complex transactions (e.g., enactment of new laws, 
government regulation or takings, or adjudication of divorce or 
inheritance or incompetence or dissolution) accomplished 
through one, or some combination of, forums - legislative, 
adrninistrative or judicial; government or private sector; local and 
community-based or distant and centralized, cheap or costly. 
• Preservation of evidence of the original rights and the 
transformations (documentary or witnesses): For example, the 
original of documents, or a copy or certified surnrnary, may be 
Commission, February 2006. Official websites of nations and States are particularly 
useful for understanding the different functions of the essential components, e.g., 
http://www.ros.gov.uk/index.html (Scotland); http://www.landregistry.gov.uk.html 
(England and Wales). 
2
2 The Ecology relies heavily on Haile, M., Witten, W., et al, 2005. 
162 lodged in collections (one or more, publicly accessible or not), 
kept safe from natural elements and human tampering, and, 
often, helpfully indexed by the names of the actors, the dates of 
the transactions or events, the piece(s) of land affected, or all of 
these. The collection may be entrusted to the interested parties, 
the State, private enterprise, or a combination. Preserving the 
evidence of aging witnesses is more difficult. 
• Registration of 'title': The rights held by various parties in the 
piece of land may
2
3 be recorded in some form. But it is essential 
to understand that 'title' is a legal conclusion, based on available 
evidence, interpreted in light of current rules - a conclusion that 
may be in error or, even though never actually in error, may 
change from time to time as a result of changes in the rules (e.g., 
a wife's rights to her husband's property on his death changed by 
a new law) or in legal reasoning (e.g., a new local government 
land-use plan, or judicial abandonment of prior reasoning), or the 
ever-occurring transformations resulting from births, deaths, and 
divorces. Keeping the records of conclusions about title up-to-
date is a key element of such systems if trust in the accuracy of 
the recorded conclusions is to be fostered. It may be accom-
plished by placing the burden on interested private parties, 
disinterested private organizations (e.g., for-profit title insurance 
companies or otherwise insured legal experts in the USA), some 
part of government, or some combination (e.g., Ghana). 
• Assurance for reliance on system errors: Insurance, or some 
other guarantee of, or mechanism for providing compensation or 
rectification is often provided for those who rely on what turn out 
to be errors in the system. Sometimes the compensation mecha-
nism is provided by government, sometimes by private insurers; 
sometimes government does not compensate but provides a 
different solution - e.g., redistribution; and sometimes there is no 
recourse at all. 
• Protection of land rights: Protection rests on the foundation of 
the other parts of the ecology. The functions may be accom-
plished through a single specialized body or a combination of 
" As an example, apparently only about 30% of English land is so registered, and 
even that is often registered in ways that hide the true owners. 
163 informal and formal forums; administrative or judicial; 
government or private sector; local and community-based or 
distant and centralized, cheap or costly; it may be done periodi-
cally and all at once or episodically and individually. Without 
real and effective protection, land rights loose much of their 
certainty and, often, their value. 
Thus, the environment in which land rights must be protected is 
complex, populated by interconnected domestic organizations and 
institutions, with quite variable configurations. It is also common -
even in highly developed, long-standing systems - for one piece or 
another of the system to be in transition from one type to another in 
order, ostensibly, to improve it from one perspective or another. 
Often, however, such changes benefit some at the expense of others 
(Kanji, N., Cotula, L., et ál, 2005). All of these statements are true 
of the complex Ethiopian land rights protection ecology, including 
as it does, Federal, State and local levels. 
in. PROTECTION OF LAND RIGHTS IN 
ETHIOPIA: FINDINGS 
Mekelle University's recent land rights research, with ÜED and 
DffD
24, was concentrated in the State of Tigray, where systematic 
post-Derg land rights protection reforms were first undertaken in 
Ethiopia. The resulting 'Tigray Model' of universal rural land 
registration and certification has subsequently been the starting point 
for all the other States' current efforts (Adenew, B., 2005), though 
many changes and improvements are underway in those other 
States, and in Tigray, as well, in part as a result of the feedback from 
MU's research. 
What did we find? Too much to report in a short paper like this, but 
examples of various strengths and weaknesses can be given. The 
2
4 Mekelle University, Mekelle, Tigray, Ethiopia; International Institute for 
Environment and Development, London; funded by the United Kingdom's 
Department for International Development. For the full report, see Haile, M., 
Witten, W., era/, 2005. 
164 most general finding is that since 1989 a multi-faceted and largely 
effective effort has been made throughout Tigray to create a 
configuration of inexpensive, local, practical institutions and 
organizations to protect land rights, one that could be and was put in 
place across the State expeditiously, uniformly, and with available 
resources. 
It doesn't take very long to describe that remarkable achievement, 
compared with the pages and pages of more extensively detailed 
problems that follow, but in large measure the effort has been quite 
successful when considered as a comprehensive system. In terms of 
the ecology of land rights protection, we find: 
Land Identification: When we look at the technology selected in 
Tigray for identification of a piece of land on registration forms and 
personal certificates, we find very low cost, locally available and 
locally well-understood choices: land is quantified using traditional 
measures (time required to plow) and demarcated primarily by the 
names of the family head, four neighbors, and a neighborhood 
within the village. Sometimes physical markers (most often stones) 
are also used. When large-scale registration was first undertaken 
anew (1996-1998), minimally trained high-school students (fulfil-
ling their civilian national service) assisted. But the primary 
evidence of land rights came from local people, confirmed in open 
general meetings. 
These choices of technology, understandably cost-based though they 
are, have consequences for the protection of land rights. In the 
positive, such land descriptions were and continue to be easy, cheap 
and quick to generate uniformly across the State
26, and in most 
every-day situations, serve adequately. But, in the negative, such 
And before 1989 in areas controlled earlier by the Tigray Peoples' Liberation 
Front (TPLF) during its struggle against the Derg. 
2
6 In Amhara State a pilot project in four villages has tested GPS and other more 
expensive and more precise technologies. But, so far, these have not been extended 
beyond the pilot area, principally for two reasons: 1) the expense and 2) the fact 
that their use removes control from the local people to experts in more distant 
locations, one of the great and common dangers of 'modernizing' land rights 
protection (Adenew, B., 2005; Quan, J. and Toulmin, C, 2004). 
165 simple descriptions are of little use in the most common land 
disputes when they do occur - encroachments (e.g., plowing or 
grazing) by one farmer into the land of a neighbor. Evidence from 
the traditional witnesses who laid out the parcels is, therefore, still 
necessary when disputes over plot boundaries arise. 
This, in turn, we found, has two corollaries. First, it corresponds to a 
difference in the way men and women tend to think about their land 
title certificates: Though men initially sought registration to mark 
the end of redistributions, and expect plot-incursion conflicts, they 
do not generally fear challenges to their 'title'. As a result, after the 
initial recording of title, the language men used to refer to their 
registration and certificates changed and did not reflect a con-
tinuation of high valuation. By contrast, women feel most threatened 
on fundamental title issues (and recent evidence indicates that they 
are, indeed, targeted in land title disputes more often than men, 
primarily because of their more limited defensive resources), and 
continue to highly value their title certificates. 
Second, as the traditional witnesses age and die, landholders in some 
areas (i.e., Samre), including men, express an increasing reliance on, 
and valuation of their land registration certificates, and have begun 
demanding better land description technology. This is also occurring 
in areas where land values are rising (most notably in peri-urban 
areas
27) and attendant disputes are also increasing. 
These findings provide part of the support for the conclusion that, 
just as in richer countries, most land holders in Ethiopia do not value 
land rights protection on conceptual grounds, but, instead, on very 
functional grounds-grounds that often take some time to manifest 
themselves, or some particular change in the environment to be 
noticed. They also demonstrate that, especially for the citizens of a 
poor country, the cost of better quality government service - here 
more accurate measurement technology - is a very real barrier. 
There have long been more exact (and expensive) land identification technologies 
at use in urban areas, primarily theodolite and tape measure. 
166 Creation and allocation of rights: In Tigray, and elsewhere in 
Ethiopia, this niche in the ecology of land rights protection displays 
an appearance of simplicity because the Derg
2
8 extinguished past 
rights and created a new set of simpler, locally rooted, uniform land 
rights granted by the State. As a result, inadequate consideration has 
been given to exactly how land rights actually arise and are 
allocated. 
For example, after the EPRDF liberalized the very restrictive Derg 
landholding laws - allowing leases and sharecropping - many 
leaseholds were created anew. But in the Tigray land registration 
system no provision was made for registering the new leasehold and 
sharecropping rights, only the original State-granted rights. As is so 
often the case with economic actors, farmers then invented other 
forms of pseudo-registration, such as signing the leases before the 
head of the village council or a village Social Court judge and 
leaving a copy with that authority. Thus, when the formal system 
failed, the people created an informal system that did much of what 
they deemed important.
2
9 
The creation and allocation of land rights is further complicated by 
the fact that several land rights systems other than the rural land 
system actually persist side-by-side in Ethiopia today, e.g., the urban 
land system vs. the rural land system; rural communal vs. rural 
individual; and rural peasant vs. rural pastoralist vs. rural investor. 
As a result, conflicts arise at each of these interfaces when rights in 
the same land are recognized in the different but unconnected 
systems. 
For example, investors in southeast Tigray were allocated (by 
village leaders, Wereda-level administrators, and a lease with the 
State Agriculture Bureau) 'unused' land in the Mehoni Plain. They 
borrowed heavily and invested in clearing the land for commercial 
Or, in areas under control of opposition movements, like the Tigray Peoples' 
Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray, the rights were effectively extinguished by both 
the Derg laws and the movements' enforcement. 
2
9 The Federal land law now requires leases be registered. 
Proclamation NO. 456/2005, Article 6.6. 
167 farming. Then they discovered the land was registered in a separate 
registry
3
0 as communal grazing land for a group living in a 
neighboring village. When the dispute was administratively adjudi-
cated at a higher level of government - the Zone that included both 
village areas - the land was reallocated to the use of the neighboring 
claimants. The investors were then given a different piece of land to 
clear and most went bankrupt. 
The adverse effect of parallel land rights systems that is most 
obvious to urban-based researchers is at the urban vs. rural interface, 
the peri-urban areas. Because the urban and rural land rights systems 
are separate in Ethiopia, as a municipal area grows rural land is 
transferred into the urban system. The natural uncertainties of such 
transfers (i.e., differing evaluations and expectations) are 
compoundded by the 'ownership' of the land by the government, the 
lack of a clear set of rules for compensation when land and improve-
ments are 'taken', the often limited capacity of local civil servants to 
follow available rules, and the coincidence that at exactly the time 
when rural citizens need their local government's protection of land 
rights, the land is transferred to the jurisdiction of a new, unknown 
and often more distant municipal government. 
The result of all these factors is that the outcomes in 'takings' 
situations of all types, but particularly in the peri-urban areas, vary 
tremendously — a sure sign of a poorly functioning system. 
Complicating the picture even more, the holders of rural land near 
expanding municipalities have invented clever
3
1 defensive strategies 
that further enlarge the variance in outcomes, making it hard to tell 
3
0 Similarly, reforestation and natural regeneration areas are usually described, 
together with agreed management rules, in written documents kept in a separate 
registration system. 
3
1 'Moon houses' and even 'moon churches', appearing over night on urban sized 
plots of rural land adjacent to municipal boundaries, in some cases have been 
construed as entitling the owner of the house to rent the plot from the municipality 
under the urban land leasing system, thus enabling the rural land holder to "sell" 
land, which is Constitutionally prohibited. However, most often the municipality 
knocks the illegal moon houses down, though not the moon churches, compensates 
the rural owner with a small urban sized plot around the family home, and then 
leases the land to the many urban land seekers. 
168 at any particular time whether the municipal administration or the 
land holders are more successful. 
But a much larger scale weakness of the post-Derg allocation of 
land rights resulted from increasing population that caused demand 
for rural land to far exceed local supplies. Thus, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, not many years after the last land redistribution the 
Constitutional right to obtain and hold rural land could no longer be 
fulfilled for youth coming of age and for adults retaning to Tigray 
villages.
3
2 Though serious efforts were made in villages to discuss 
the problem, prioritize those without land, and find unused land 
within the village boundaries for allocation, the problem grew 
inexorably worse. 
In addition to the severe limitations of already too small family 
holdings, only very small amounts of land were remming to the 
local government for reallocation — primarily when villagers with 
land died without eligible heirs.
3
3 And because the problem existed 
at the local level, as a result of the policy choices that emphasized 
local control, no solution could be found. Eventually, however, 
when the problem reached a politically sensitive extent, with a large 
portion of rural people State-wide being landless, new land was 
located - a good example of different solutions being available to 
different scales of government. 
The largest source of new land has now come from higher levels of 
government searching larger areas for unused land. In the western 
'borderlands' of all of the large highland States, great swaths of land 
have been located that have never been settled, primarily because of 
malaria. With improved malaria control these areas have been 
opened to voluntary settlement, including the slow and sometimes 
clumsy establishment of the same local institutions and organiza-
tions to protect land rights as are found in the highlands. 
Returning from, among other places, forced resettlement by the Derg in southern 
Ethiopia, refugee camps in the Sudan, and the TPLF's combatant ranks. 
3
3 A smaller source of new land to meet demand has been the enforcement of two 
rights in rural land reserved to the State by the Federal land laws, triggered when 
landholders abandon or mismanage their land. See Transformation, below. 
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rights were over-simplified, transformation and reallocation of land 
rights have received insufficient consideration in Tigray and 
elsewhere in Ethiopia in the post-Derg period. At the village level, 
transforming events, such as births, deaths, marriages, divorces, 
determinations of incapacity, loans, and myriad others, are well 
known. But until 1996, little of this information was systematically 
noted in any permanent form. And if it was, for example, written 
down, the records were scattered in a variety of traditional and 
more-modern individual, religious, admimstrative and judicial 
systems. The only place the information came together and was tied 
to land was in people's minds, and often they had different and 
conflicting interests and agendas and drew different conclusions. 
The uncertainly that resulted caused disputes to slowly become 
more common again until, in 1996, the new system was put in place, 
see Registration of Title, below. 
But, as well as these record-keeping issues, transformation of land 
rights also has direct ramifications. For example, the Federal land 
laws identify two special rights in all rural land, allocate them to the 
State government, and mandate that the States enforce them. First, 
the State should take the land of rural land holders who leave their 
land for more than a period of years fixed by the State.
3
4 Second, the 
State should take the land of anyone who has 'environmentally 
3
4 FDRE proclamation No. 456/2005, Article 9.1. Exceptions to this rule in the 
Tigray State proclamations, currently highly criticized by rural communities and 
being considered for State legislative change, protect the rights of some ex-fighters 
and early urban migrants to maintain rural land even though they live in urban 
areas. In Tigray, the period is two years if traditional farming technology is in use, 
ten with modern. In Amhara the period has now been set at twenty years. The 
difference seems to correlate most strongly with differences in unfilled demand for 
rural land. The assumption behind this right seems to be that anyone able to stay 
away from their village for the specified number of years has another viable source 
of income and their land should be made available to those with no land and no 
other source of income. In cases where this is demonstrably not the case (i.e., 
Ethiopians detained in Eritrea during the recent war), the rule has not been applied. 
There is a correlation between Tigray's 2 year loss-through-absence provision and a 
limitation on leasing rural land that limits small holder lease periods to 2 years for 
"traditional technology" and 10 years for 'modern technology". Unfortunately, the 
two quoted terms are not defined. 
170 mismanaged' their land. In each of these cases, the land taken 
returns to the local village council for reallocation to the landless. 
In determining whether the land has been 'left' or 'environmentally 
mismanaged', the local village government's administrative discre-
tion plays a major role. It can, therefore, be either helpful, harmful, 
or some mixture. For example, there is some evidence that 'environ-
mental mismanagement', even with large extension programs to help 
landholders comply, allows too much room for traditional biases and 
has been misused to take the land of people a local government 
wants to punish (Hoben, A., 2001; Adal, Y., 1997; Debele, B., 1997; 
Ege, S., 1997). Interestingly, the State cabinet-member who over-
sees the Tigray State land rights system
3
6 points out that Tigray has 
never allowed this form of land reallocation, specifically because it 
is too open to such mischief.
3
7 
A different result from administrative discretion is found when 
considering the second State right, at least in Tigray. There women 
often move to their husband's village where there is no land to be 
allocated to them. A strict application of the land-abandonment law 
would probably dictate that these women lose any land they have in 
their home village and become landless. However, one of the 
common outcomes in Tigray villages has been to allow women to 
hold land in their home village until they receive land in their new 
village. This is generally considered a beneficial outcome, despite 
pressure from the landless for land. 
A related, but as yet unquantified, transformation effect has been 
more difficult to study because it occurs over a longer period of 
time. As noted in the Delineation section above, the right to inherit 
land is also subject to limitation in State Constitutions and procla-
3
5 FDRE proclamation No. 456/2005, Article 10.1. 
3
6 Now EPLAUA, Environmental Planning, Land Administration, and Use 
Authority. In 2004, amendments to the Tigray State land proclamation reorganized 
the role of government in land administration, creating this dedicated Authority as 
part of the changes to correct past deficiencies, modeled at least in part on the 
Amhara changes to the 'Tigray Model'. 
3
7 Personal communication, February 2005. 
171 mations. In Tigray, for example, where land pressure is very high 
and many family holdings are already below the size necessary to 
produce a living, the right to inherit has been limited by social 
welfare principles applied by the local government in accordance 
with State regulations. Principal among these are that not all 
children have equal rights to inherit; that children with another 
source of income shall not inherit, even if that means there are no 
qualified heirs; and that children who have stayed on the land to 
help the parents farm shall have a better right to inherit. 
One result of this intersection of principles is that women who 
marry men with land and income in another village, and thus do not 
stay to help their parents farm, are less likely to inherit than their 
brothers, even though they usually cannot obtain their own land in 
their husband's village. Thus, despite the official policy and laws 
providing equal rights to land to men and women, despite effective 
implementation of those policies when there was adequate land, and 
even despite the local governments' efforts to allow women to keep 
their own land in their home village, land holdings may slowly 
become concentrated in male hands. This is a good example of 
formal and informal institutions interacting with what appear to be 
entirely unexpected and unintended consequences. 
Preservation of evidence: In an impoverished agricultural society 
like rural Ethiopia, efforts to improve preservation of evidence 
include a wide range of adrninistratively-complex undertakings, 
from general education so people can read and value documents to 
patching the roof on the agricultural extension agent's office to 
improving record keeping in the courts, and much more. Perhaps 
most important, however, is to create the understanding that these 
pieces must all be tied together in one way or another. 
It is not an accident that the demand for better preservation of land-
rights evidence grew with every passing year after the last land 
distribution occurred. As events affecting land rights accumulated 
over time without a systematic way to connect them to resolution of 
disputes, uncertainty of outcomes increased. Thus, it is that the 
introduction in 1996 of a Statewide land title registration system in 
172 Tigray was conceptualized as a way to preserve evidence in a 
simplified form - as opposed to a way to record legal conclusions 
based on evidence preserved in separate archives. Those who set up 
the system did not adequately consider that changing laws (e.g., 
concerning who inherits) affect how the legal conclusion of title is 
determined, and may require reassessment of the evidence of 
original or transforming events. 
This misconceptualization led to some of the weaknesses of the 
Land Title Registration system. One of these is the failure to 
adequately improve the preservation of the underlying documentary 
evidence on which the legal conclusions of title are based. 
Registration of 'title': Between 1996 and 1998 a new system 
designed to increase the security of rural land was designed and put 
in place throughout Tigray State. Of particular importance was the 
policy choice to accomplish this by building on other aspects of 
local governance that had been subject to vigorous improvement 
under the TPLF even during the Derg, including village councils 
and the judiciary. 
Using simple forms, the traditional land description technology 
noted above, the local language, minimally trained technicians, 
negligible per-family charges (US $00.25 for a Certificate), and a 
review of all evidence of then existing land rights, legal conclusions 
about title were determined and recorded at the village level. The 
record books were kept in the local village government offices 
(either the Council President's office or the Agricultural Extension 
Agent's office, whichever seemed better protected against rain, 
rodents, mold and people) and a Certificate was provided for each 
family. The entire system was administered locally by the village 
council, with planning and oversight from more distant levels of 
government at the Wereda (County) and State levels. 
On the positive side, the speed and evenhandedness of 
implementation across the entire State, and its acceptance by the 
people with very little controversy, stand out. The source of the 
173 Systems strength most often mentioned by farmers was that it was 
established as part of 'their' existing effective local government. 
Unfortunately, on the negative side, issues that a more thorough 
study of the ecology of land rights protection might have made clear 
were not adequately addressed. Most importantly, no provision for 
keeping the written records of the legal conclusions about title up-
to-date was institutionalized. After only a few years, many of the 
records of title became unreliable. There is conflicting evidence as 
to whether up-dating was countenanced in Tigray (though it is now 
clearly on the agenda in all State programs, with USATD assistance 
focused on it). A second problem —that the registration and certifi-
cation forms ran out and were not resupplied- compounded the 
problem. 
These systematic failures would have most adversely affected 
women, particularly on divorce, because of the then State rule 
(clearly derived from traditional practice, and now changed by 
Federal law
38) of registering and certifying a family's land rights in 
the name of the head of the family - a male if present. Upon 
divorce, fairly common in highland Ethiopia, no new certificate or 
registration page in the woman's name was issued. Had the records 
been the sole source of land rights, women might have lost their 
land, as has been well documented during formalization of land 
rights systems in other countries (Quan, J. and Touhnin, C, 2004). 
But because the land title registration system had been established as 
part of the existing relatively effective local government system, 
administrative discretion again provided a solution to the potentially 
harmful consequences of these apparently unforeseen events. As a 
result, we found no evidence that women's rights to their share of 
their family's land were ever compromised as a result of this failure. 
Assurance for reliance on system errors: In Ethiopia, there is no 
public (as in Europe) or private (as in the USA) provision for 
insurance for those who rely on errors (e.g., out-of-date or incorrect 
Proclamation No. 456/2005, Article 6.4. 
174 records) in the rural land rights protection system. Instead, because 
both the allocation and protection systems are nearly completely 
local, there are very few rural landholders who do not reside where 
their land is, and information is easily available, the community 
provides assurance, at least to community members. 
Thus, in many cases, as in the case of divorced women noted above, 
the local councils were able to address unforeseen problems through 
administrative action, providing a kind of assurance system. It is this 
last finding that has required couching the overall research results 
as: a simple inexpensive local registration system can work well, 
even with major oversimplifications, if it is established within an 
existing system of effective local governance.
3
9 This is the reason 
the adjustment of the 'Tigray Model' following the Amhara State 
experience is being watched closely. 
But, unfortunately, assurance and administrative discretion have two 
sides. We also found cases where local village councils colluded 
with a non-governmental credit association in the use of the threat of 
loss of land rights to enforce credit repayment. This is, of course, 
formally prohibited because mortgages, and transfers due to fore-
closure, are specifically banned by the Constitution for the specific 
policy objective of ensuring that rural farmers do not lose their land 
through default on loans. 
However, we also found another of the tools of good governance at 
work: oversight. When Wereda (County) and State-level admi-
nistrators learned of the illegal collusion they promptly reversed the 
local decisions and instituted further training for local government 
administrators. Similar oversight results, as with several changes 
noted above induced by the Federal land laws, were found in other 
cases where what State and local administrators thought were 
What is a system of effective local government? This is a good but complicated 
question, unfortunately far beyond the limitations of this study. The term is used 
here simply to mean a system of local government that effectively solves most 
problems that arise in the community in a way the community accepts, and as such, 
the term has the weakness of being suspiciously tautological. 
175 innovative solutions turned out to be ill-advised, or plainly illegal, 
and were corrected. 
Are all such problems corrected through administrative and 
legislative solutions? Clearly not. Which leads us to consider the full 
range of correctives. 
Protection of rights: Particularly for the poor, protection of land 
rights depends upon local systems. Protecting land rights from 
private or public attacks can be expensive, mounting in cost as 
distance, time away from home, and the need for expertise increase. 
One reason people in Tigray give for favoring local administrative 
solutions is that through them the government subsidizes the 
expense of enforcement. Of course, where the local government is 
the problem, as in the case mentioned above of collusion with debt 
collectors, local relief may not be available. 
In Tigray, and subsequently elsewhere in Ethiopia, a sustained 
government effort has attempted to supplement more traditional 
dispute resolution methods. Prior research by Mekelle University 
Law Faculty into the village Social Courts and Wereda (District) 
Courts compliments its land research and underscores both the 
popularity and the weaknesses of the dispute resolution options 
available to rural landholders. 
Thus, rural land rights disputes are usually resolved within the 
village using a) traditional social dispute mechanisms (e.g., elders 
and/or those witnesses who participated in the last land distribution); 
b) local government administrative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
or c) the village Social Court - a 'hybrid'
4
0 judicial system. 
4
0 'Hybrid' because the people elected locally to serve, voluntarily and without pay 
(until July 2005, when they were voted small reimbursements), as social court 
judges are much like the kinds of people who serve as mediators in the traditional 
dispute resolution forums and, as traditionally, they encourage parties to settle 
disputes amicably before eventually exercising their authority to decide the case; 
yet the social court also operates with a clear set of rules of procedure and a 
simplified version of the same law applied in higher courts, and there is an appeal 
to the Wereda court. 
176 These dispute resolution mechanisms are all within the village and 
therefore are relatively inexpensive to access; but each also has its 
problems and limitations. For example, the traditional systems are, 
as almost the world over, sometimes biased in favor of men or the 
powerful. When the administrative systems err, formal appeal can 
be difficult because acbrünistrative law is a very under-developed, 
and even less-utilized, area of Ethiopian law. And the village Social 
Court, because it applies somewhat more technical rules with less 
training, is often perceived as less reliable. 
All three local forums may also be subject more generally to local 
community pressures, political pressure, abuse of power, and 
corruption. It is this which makes the availability of appeal from the 
Social Court to the Wereda (District) Court, away from village 
forces, very important. But while that appeal is necessary, it is, 
unfortunately, not sufficient: for the poorest the extra cost favors the 
rich. For all of these reasons together, forum shopping among the 
three can be an issue. Though the hierarchy of jurisdiction is clear, 
with each party able to opt out
4
1 of the traditional in favor of the 
adrninistrative, and with the administrative giving way to the 
judicial, that ultimate step can favor the rich. Thus, though efforts 
have been made to balance the attributes of the different forums, the 
balance is not yet completely satisfactory. 
In any case, a threat to land rights that requires enforcement is costly 
and uncertain for the poorest, those already living very much on the 
edge. Defending rights requires and taxes scarce resources. And 
there is, for example, now at least anecdotal evidence in Tigray that 
women's land rights are attacked more frequently than men's 
because women have fewer resources available for defending. 
These considerations have lead to discussions
4
2 about how to 
strengthen subsidized administrative dispute resolution, while at the 
same time providing more oversight. Getting the balance right 
Of course, rights to 'opt out', as with Ethiopia's Sharia Courts, must be known and 
those with the rights must be free and able to use them. 
4
2 Personal communications with the Tigray State cabinet member overseeing land 
issues, February and July, 2005. 
177 requires constant attention as institutions and organizations evolve. 
At this time, throughout Ethiopia these issues appear to be high on 
the agenda of the government but good information about how the 
systems are working, or not working, is not always available and 
solutions, as in every society, are often partial and subject to further 
adjustment. 
CONCLUSION 
Several different types of conclusions may be drawn. 
Systematically, we can certainly conclude that international human 
rights instruments, per se, have little direct impact on domestic land 
rights. Protection of land rights takes place in a complex and 
constantly evolving environment of interconnected domestic institu-
tions and organizations. The public legislative, administrative, and 
judicial functions, as well as the more obvious private transactions, 
all play a role in protecting land rights. In Ethiopia's Federal system, 
this ecology also includes the diversity of the Federal level and mul-
tiple States. Changes in the ecology occur constantly as a result of 
learning, exercise of appeals, democratic forces and transitions, 
'civil society' activism, and, unfortunately, violence; often both the 
land rights ecology and the effects of changes to it, are not well 
understood and usually changes benefit some people more than 
others. 
Still, there are some principles which can be abstracted because in 
many cases the domestic institutions and organizations have well-
known - though not well-calibrated and easily-achieved - general 
balance points and trade-offs. For example, we have seen the 
strengths of local government from high-quality and low-cost 
information versus their susceptibility to discrimination and abuse of 
power, whether intended or not. And we have seen how larger scale 
solutions are only possible at larger scales of government, as with 
the opening of new State or national lands to settlement, with the 
unfortunate inverse correlation of larger scales of government being 
further removed from the concerns of the people. Yet, while 
178 interesting, such abstractions don't help us understand the 
complexity of improving the land rights protection system. 
And it can not be denied that there is much room for improvement 
in Ethiopia. In fact, we have seen that many changes are indeed 
currently underway as a result of both State and Federal initiatives. 
However, these efforts to improve, as everywhere, require an under-
standing of the complexity and interdependent nature of the system; 
collection of good quality information about current affairs; 
mechanisms to inform and train the huge number of politicians, civil 
servants, and judges involved in legislation, administration and 
judicial review; and frequent exercise of those systems, like the 
judiciary, that are internally designed to improve through the 
exercise of appeals. 
Thus, within the hard realities, protecting land rights is not very 
different from protecting other human rights that can only effecti-
vely be protected through domestic systems. Progress is slow and 
requires great effort at the Federal, State and local levels. Cost is 
always an issue. How the system should be changed is always 
subject to debate and — particularly in poor countries constantly 
bombarded with "experts" from different countries, with their 
insular knowledge of one or a few ways of doing the thing - that 
debate is often a confusing and frustrating milieu, sometimes under-
mined by piecing together contrary methods that don't work 
together. 
So, instead of ending with abstractions about land rights protection, 
on this particular occasion I would like to consider the specific 
efforts of the Mekelle University Law Faculty (MULF) towards 
improving human rights protection in general and land rights in 
particular. By considering these specific efforts, we may gain a pers-
pective on how the protection of human rights in general may be 
improved. 
From its inception MULF has undertaken practical field research on 
the strengths and weaknesses of human rights protection; formu-
lated, funded and provided continuing education and shorter tailored 
179 frainings for civil servants and Social Court and Wereda Court 
judges; provided advisory services and legislative drafting services 
for the State parliament; and engaged regularly with all these 
organizations through workshops and performance reviews. 
But this is not enough. Citizens, too, have a role to play and an 
obligation to do so. Many of the systems by which we expect human 
rights protection to be improved require that citizens exercise the 
system. And perhaps here a topical analogy to the right to free and 
fair elections is appropriate. As the Carter Center, in its Final 
Statement on the May 2005 Ethiopian elections concluded, "If 
parties decide not to file court appeals, the [National Election Board 
of Ethiopia's] announced results should be accepted as final and 
legitimate."
4
3 Just as in challenges to elections in Florida, USA, or in 
Birmingham, UK, or in the Ukraine, there are, in the end, only the 
existing domestic institutions and organizations to turn to for 
protection of human rights. If citizens do not exercise the appeals by 
which much improvement, by design, must occur, then those impro-
vements will not happen, and society will suffer. 
Of course, that so many of the citizens of Ethiopia are as poor as 
they are means that they need assistance to exercise the systems. 
Which is why the MULF Legal Aid Clinic, the first in Ethiopia 
based in a university, and housed in the same off-campus building as 
the MULF Human Rights Center, provides legal services to poor 
land holders. 
Finally, that some States in Ethiopia are slower, and clumsier, than 
others to improve should not surprise Europeans any more than it 
does this American author. There are plenty of well-known 
examples among the States of the European Union (e.g., the results 
of Italy's late Twentieth Century devolution of power to regional 
states, see Putnam, R., 1993). And that is why MULF also, through 
every possible means, from participating in the design of a USAJD 
land rights security project to participating in the Capacity Building 
Ministry's committee to strengthen legal education (including 
43The Carter Center, September 15, 2005, 
www.cartercenter.org/documents/2199.pdf, p.3. 
180 research) in all of Ethiopia's law schools, seeks to improve and 
spread its broad approach to strengthening the Ethiopian domestic 
institutions and organizations that are all that can, in the end, protect 
human rights. 
Thus, I would like to take this opportunity to encourage MULF to 
continue and strengthen all these programs, and to ask that those 
who support them in these endeavors continue their vital support. 
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